Crude Oil Price Determinants by Möbert, Jochen
Darmstadt Discussion Papers 
in Economics 
 
 
 
 
 
Crude Oil Price Determinants 
 
 
Jochen Möbert 
 
 
Nr. 186 
 
 
 
 
Arbeitspapiere 
des Instituts für Volkswirtschaftslehre 
Technische Universität Darmstadt 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A R E 
pplied 
conomics  
esearch in 
Crude Oil Price Determinants∗
Jochen Moebert
May 16, 2007
This version August 10, 2007
Abstract
Based on monthly observations, I specify an econometric model capturing the driving
forces behind the crude oil price series in recent years. A large set of covariates, such as
supply and demand variables as well as futures market variables, is used to test the impact
on the crude oil price. Current price movements are a result of scarce refining capacity and
speculators betting on higher prices. The results also question OPEC’s market power.
JEL Classification: C51, Q41
Keywords: Crude oil market, Econometric modelling
Contact details of the author:
Darmstadt University of Technology, Institute of Economics, Applied Economic Research
and Microeconometrics, Marktplatz 15, Residenzschloss, D-64283 Darmstadt, Germany,
moebert@vwl.tu-darmstadt.de
∗I am grateful to David Knorr, Michael Opel, Dominik Roland, Patrick Tydecks, Horst Entorf and Philip
Savage for support and comments. Details on EIA data were provided by Joel Lou and Bill Horvath.
1
1 Introduction
Surprisingly, the number of researchers investigating the impact of crude oil determinants on the
series itself is not as large as I expected before this research project started. Most economists
are concerned with diminished growth rates, monetary policy, or business cycle costs levied on
economies and industries if oil prices soar.1 Hence, the price series is taken as an explanatory
variable but is not the object of interest itself. A noteworthy exception is Kaufmann et al. (2004),
which analyzes OPEC’s influence on oil prices and thereby develops an important crude oil
model. These researchers used quarterly data and investigated the period from 1986 to 2000. I
can improve the model with respect to frequency and also analyze a newer time span. Moreover,
I have a larger set of covariates which captures nearly all relevant oil price factors I can think
of. This data-driven approach fills a gap in the literature and enables me to efficiently analyse
both the supply and the demand side.2
Reaching an understanding of the oil market requires an investigation of the actions and
interaction of market participants such as the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC), its member nations, industrial nations, and others. Equally important might be reliable
estimates of bottlenecks such as lifting capacity, transportation capacity, or refining capacity.3
The maintenance and extension of these production capacities depend on available technologies.
For instance, in the near future modern drilling equipment may increase the amount of crude oil
produced and may avoid shortages. In the future, another factor influencing the oil price might
be lack of oil reserves.4
1Cf. Rotemberg and Woodford (1996), Clarida et al. (2000), Hamilton and Herrera (2004), among others
2Of course, combining the data analysis with theoretical models is even more appealing. However, the
data-driven approach may also improve future theories as well as corresponding econometric models.
3Allen (2005) summarizes several arguments on the production capacity but without an econometric analysis.
Curlee et al. (1987) analyse several scenarios which might lead to supply disruptions.
4How to define and measure oil reserves is described in Haider (2000). There is a heated debate on whether
oil reserves are rapidly dwindling, as proposed by some geologists (cf. Campbell and Laherre`re (1998), Campbell
(2004), Greene et al. (2006)) or, as stated by official institutions such as OPEC as well as its counterpart the
International Energy Agency (IEA) whether it will be available several decades (cf. Watkins (2006)). However,
from my point of view, relying on official statistics instead of these geological arguments seems appropriate since in
the long-run truth-telling is an incentive-compatible choice for OPEC as a whole as well as crude oil demanders.
Oil-exporting nations have low incentives to hide a possible lack of crude oil until all reserves are exploited.
Otherwise, they miss the chance to sell the scarce oil reserves at even higher prices before oil wells and other oil
resources are completely exhausted. Obviously, oil-importing countries also prefer to be informed on oil scarcity
to minimize costs arising in the transition process from the oil age to a new energy era. Given this reasoning,
an abrupt disclosure of oil shortages is unlikely and would imply that all major market participants are hiding
information and are misinformed today. Such coordination failures have arisen in the history of financial markets
but the frequency of occurrence of such global misjudgements has been rather small.
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The oil price is one of the financial series widely reported on in the media. However, not
only one single oil price is fixed every day. Instead, the number of oil grades traded is as large
as the number of important oil wells. Oil from different sources differs with respect to the
chemical composition, in particular the sulfur content and its density, and oil from less valuable
spouters is traded at lower prices. Accordingly, the discounted price captures the lower industrial
applicability and, given constant qualities of oil grades, the price discount is stable across time
(cf. Hornsell and Mabro (2003), Wang (2003), Bacon and Tordo (2004), among others). Hence,
a model explaining a particular oil grade is directly transferrable to other oil grades as well. In
standard financial data sheets the oil prices of important wells are listed, e.g. Brent, Nigeria
Brass, West Texas Intermediate, among others. In this article the regressand is the price of
West Texas Intermediate (WTI), a reference oil for North America. WTI is a high quality oil
due to its low sulfur content and its low density.5 The corresponding futures contracts traded
at the NYMEX6 are the most liquid futures contracts worldwide. For this reason, this data
series is especially suited for my purposes since several futures market variables are included in
the econometric specifications. The data is available at a monthly frequency where each value
is observed on the first day of each month. December 1995 is the first observation month of
the sample and the last month is January 2006, such that for each series 122 observations are
available.
Figure 1(a) points out how volatile the nominal and real USD WTI price were in the last
decade. After the Asian crisis, oil prices plummet and oil futures and oil spot markets were
not cointegrated as before as shown by Hammoudeh and Li (2004). The price range of the
crude oil series indicates the high degree of volatility in this market. After the Asian crisis in
1999 prices had fallen down to around 11 USD before the boom market started and pushed
prices up to nearly 70 USD in October 2005. Similar price ranges were observed in Germany
and Japan and such large price changes of an important commodity from around six hundred
percent readily attract the attention of economists. Also, before the observation period volatile
prices were steadily observed in the oil price history. Krichene (2002) investigated the first two
phases of the oil market in the last century. The first phase, the noncompetitive nonvolatile
crude oil market, ended with the cartelization among OPEC states in 1973.7 The cartelization
5Cf. Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook 2006.
6The New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) is the world’s largest commodity market.
7In real terms current market prices are still below the oil price in 1973.
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Figure 1: Nominal vs. Real Crude Oil Prices of Selected Countries
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Nominal Oil Price Real Oil Price.
Own source: Real and nominal crude oil price (monthly series) in local currencies from December 1995 to
January 2006. The base year is midyear 2000. Notice the different scales at the ordinates of each subfigure.
4
triggered the first oil price shock and increased price volatility thereafter in the second phase.
In particular, oil prices soar when important political decisions related to the Mideast such as
oil shocks and wars8 or both, appear on the political agenda. However, the development in
recent years might differ from previous developments. Many analysts argue that a new period
has arisen in which the emergence of the world’s largest economies - in particular China and
India - have reshaped the landscape. There is the fear that oil resources and capacities will be
readily exhausted if heavily populated countries such as India and China strive for western-style
living conditions.9
From a methodological point of view, an oil market analysis can be fairly simple. The
behaviour of market participants is often explainable using standard textbook arguments. The
demand side consists of a very large number of countries, companies, and households and can
be characterized by large economy models. Of course, the number of suppliers is much smaller.
OPEC Countries and large European and American oil companies are the main oil suppliers.
Due to the presence of the OPEC cartel and its continuous attempt to reduce the supply OPEC’s
behavior must be taken into account. However, a section explaining theoretical details (cf. Gray
(1914), Hotelling (1931), de La Grandville (1980), Tvedt (2002), among others) on the oil market
is omitted. In the following Section the data base and hypotheses are described. First, demand
factors, then supply factors and, finally, futures market variables are discussed in the following
subsections. Subsequently, Kaufmann’s et al. (2004) work is repeated and extended with the
data in Section 3. The main model is contained in Section 4, which establishes a market model,
and Section 5 concludes.
2 Covariates and Hypotheses
2.1 Demand Factors
An important crude oil variable is the market demand. An increased need for crude oil need
shifts the demand curve in a price-quantity diagram to the right and thereby increases the oil
8Foster (1996) shows how spot and futures markets were interrelated before the first US-Iraq Gulf war in the
nineties.
9Cf. Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook 2006.
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Figure 2: Crude Oil Demand (mbd) and Petroleum Reserves (in billion barrels)
(a) Global Demand (b) OECD stocks
OECD OECD, Europe US Total OECD US stocks
Japan  China India OECD Europe Japan
Data source: Annual Energy Review 2006 and Monthly Energy Review 2006, Energy Information
Administration. Global oil demand is depicted in Figure 3(b).
price if the supply curve is not completely elastic. As shown in Figure 2, the crude oil demand of
large industrialised nations and the OECD as a whole rises very slowly. Following the oil price
shocks in the seventies, developed countries came to bitterly regret their strong dependence on
foreign oil. Thereafter, oil-importing economies tried to reduce oil as an input factor and also
began to replace oil with suitable substitutes. These efforts lead to a reduction of consumption
per head while the total consumption was still slightly increasing in Western nations. In the
sample the minimum demand was 43.7 mbd whereas the maximal value was 51.9 mbd and if a
deseasonalized series is used the range is even smaller.10 A steady demand growth is observable
for India and China. India’s demand strongly increased from approximately 1.6 mbd to 2.5
mbd and China’s demand grew even stronger from around 3.5 mbd in 1995 to considerably
more than 7 mbd in 2005. To obtain monthly values India’s and China’s demand was linearly
interpolated. These figures indicate the strong growth of these economies. However, relative to
OECD demand their demand is low which points out the large future demand.
10In the sample, the mean of all summer months amounts to 46.696 mbd whereas the mean of winter months
amounts to 49.143 mbd.
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2.2 Petroleum Stocks
After the first oil crisis, OECD member states established an oil stock to prevent unforeseen
circumstances cutting down global oil supply. In January 2006, the OECD petroleum stock
amounted to 4.1 billion barrels.11 The development of this variable called OECD stock, as well
as stocks of large nations/regions such as the United States, Japan, and Europe is shown in
Figure 2(b). I construct the variable OECD days introduced by Kaufmann et al. (2004) which
is the ratio of OECD stock in million barrel and OECD demand in million barrel per day.12
OECD days can therefore be interpreted as an indicator of the independence of oil-importing
countries from price shocks and OPEC.13 Kaufmann et al. (2004) expect a negative impact on
the price “consistent with results described by Kaufmann (1995) and Balabanoff (1995)... . An
increase in stocks reduces real oil price by diminishing reliance on current production and thereby
reducing the risk premium associated with a supply disruption.” However, from my point of
view positive coefficients can also be expected. If petroleum stocks are filled (released) then
demand increases (decreases) and crude oil prices might rise (fall). Correspondingly, positive
coefficients are measured. Accordingly, no clear sign of the corresponding OECD stock coefficient
is expected.
2.3 Supply Factors
Production Variables
The production process in the petroleum industry is often separated into an upstream,
midstream, and downstream segment. The upstream segment summarizes exploration and
production activities. The production costs vary across different regions and production
11“Petroleum stocks include crude oil (including strategic reserves), unfinished oils, natural gas plant liquids,
and refined products.”, Energy Information Administration/Monthly Energy Review December 2006, p.156.
12Throughout the whole paper, all variables except the oil price itself are identifiable through underlines.
13Other variables often discussed in the media are US petroleum stocks. They account for approximately 1.7
billion barrels or 40% of total OECD stocks. Due to the exceptional position of the United States, US oil stocks
are steadily observed by oil analysts. Total US oil stocks can be divided into several categories. For instance, the
strategic petroleum reserve (SPR) merely consists of crude oil and amounts to around 0.7 billion barrels. SPR
stocks are under the control of the federal government whereas other stocks exist due to the refining process or
are part of the supply chain. The sum of US crude oil stocks amount to more than fifty percent of the total US
stocks. The non-crude oil stocks consists of heating oil, gasoline, and other oil products. All three series evolved
similarly in the observed period. They exhibit a low degree of variability and show a small upward trend at the
end of the sample.
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methods. Producers in the Middle East have the lowest costs of approximately 4 US dollar
per barrel.14 International oil majors declare production costs of between 6 and 12 US dollars
per barrel in their annual reports (cf. Birol and Davie (2001)). The production of unconventional
oil lies in a larger cost range but is often higher than the conventional production. Due
to technological progress all exploration costs, in particular costs of offshore explorations,
have decreased in recent decades. Accordingly, the exploratory success rate offshore has
steadily increased (cf. Forbes and Zampelli (2000)). Unfortunately, the number of public series
containing information on the upstream segment is small. Oil majors offer some information
on exploration costs in their company reports. However, the construction of variables covering
global exploration activities is very demanding since all or at least much company information
must be aggregated. The only upstream variable I include is PROD rig which counts the number
of active drilling rigs.15 I expect that more active drilling rigs reduce the crude oil price.
The midstream16 contains the transportation sector. Crude oil is often shipped by large oil
carriers. One important ship class is the ‘very large crude-oil carriers’ (VLCC) which have a
deadweight tonnage from 200,000 dwt to 315,000 dwt.17 There also exists the ultra class with
even higher tonnage. Some tankers of the ULCC-class (ultra large crude-oil carriers) have more
than 500,000 dwt. In total, in the mid-nineties 427 VLCCs and ULCCs carried crude oil across
oceans whereas 472 oil carriers were used at the end of the observation period. However, there
are many more VLCCs than ULCCs. Therefore, I take into account the charter prices measured
in thousand USD per day of this class. In the last years of the sample, a strong price increase
is shown in Figure 3(a), which possibly reflects the shortage of global tanker capacity. The
extension of the tanker fleet requires large capital investments and time since the production of
large carriers lasts several years. Therefore, the transportation process can be a bottleneck in
the production process (cf. Brook et al. (2004)). However, the shipping costs per barrel are still
fairly low and only around a few cents. I conjecture that higher charter prices have a modest
positive impact on the WTI series.18
The downstream segment cracks oil into finished products such as gasoline, heating oil, and
14In Birol and Davie (2001) the original unit is barrel of oil equivalent (boe), to be exact.
15The data was provided by www.bakerhughes.com.
16In some articles only upstream and downstream segments are distinguished. Then, the transportation sector
is part of the upstream sector.
17dwt abbreviates ‘deadweight tonnage’, which measures the cargo capacity of a carrier.
18Of course, simultaneity might be an issue. However, I will skip this issue until Section 4.
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Figure 3: Oil Production - Refining Capacities and Very Large Crude-Oil Carriers (VLCC)
(a) VLCC (b) Refining Capacity and Demand (in mbd)
VLCC rates (in 1000 USD/day) Global Capacity Global Demand
WTI spot oil price OECD-Capacity US-Capacity
Russia’s Capacity China’s Capacity
Data Source: (a) P.F. Bassøe AS, www.pfbassoe.no. (b) EIA, Annual Energy Review 2006, Table 11.9 World
Crude Oil Refining Capacity, 1970-2005.
other products. This cracking process takes place in refineries mostly located in industrialized
countries. Figure 3(b) shows the global refining capacity in million barrels per day (mbd)
and the capacity of countries with large capacities. The global refining capacity is defined as
the maximum amount of crude oil which can be processed in a calendar year divided by the
number of days in the corresponding year. This data series is therefore an annual average and
each reported value is assumed to be the midyear value. Then, monthly data were calculated
through linear interpolation. Errors arising by interpolating the data are probably negligible
since refining capacity is a very stable time series as shown in Figure 3(b). No refining capacity
value was available for the last months until January 2006 since the EIA-data series only lasts
until 2005. I completed the series by adding figures from the Oil&Gas Journal (OGJ), where
end of year data on global refining capacity is reported until the end of 2005.19 Besides the low
variability of refining capacity, it is noticeable that the global demand exceeded global refining
capacity in 2004. Hence, this scarcity of global free refining capacity measured by the variable
PROD fref might be one reason for rising oil prices, and a positive impact on the WTI series is
expected.
19Cf. Nakamura (2005) in the OGJ. Furthermore, the primary source of EIA refining capacity is the OGJ. Until
January 2007, EIA did not update their refining capacity. Hence, this data series is still the most current figures.
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OPEC Variables
Another important and intensively debated supply side factor is the behaviour of
OPEC-countries which try to shorten their supply to push up the market price and thereby
earn profits (cf. Griffin (1985), Jones (1990), Ramcharran (2002), De Santis (2003), Kaufmann
(2004), among others). OPEC uses several instruments to impinge on the oil market. Since
1983 OPEC has announced the production quota of all its member countries which measures
the overall OPEC supply. In addition, to monitor the price directly, OPEC introduced a target
corridor between 22 and 28 US dollars in March 2000. It was planned that prices above the
corridor increase OPEC’s production. However, after market prices continued to rise above 28
US dollars for more than a year OPEC suspended its corridor in June 2005. However, they
announced the reintroduction of a new corridor when the market settles down again. It seems
that OPEC countries lost power and were pleasantly surprised by recent market developments.20
Another factor diminishing the power of OPEC is the discipline among its members. Each
of the current eleven OPEC-countries always has incentives to sell more oil than agreed among
OPEC members.21 Correspondingly, each country gains at the expense of the other OPEC
members since selling larger amounts of crude oil reduces the market price and harms the other
OPEC members. Several strategies are available to OPEC members to gain from the artificial
scarcity the OPEC cartel is maintaining. One strategy is to disregard OPEC’s production
agreement and produce more and sell more oil than the agreement allows. Another somewhat
more subtle way to violate OPEC agreements is the redefinition of oil sands as oil reserves.
Given OPEC’s regulations - for more than two decades OPEC’s production quotas have been
linked to reserves - this redefinition automatically allocates higher production quotas to these
countries.
Both strategies decrease the oil price and threaten the cartel stability (cf. Jabir (2001)).
A factor which can be used as a proxy for cartel stability is the free production capacity of oil
facilities in each OPEC country. Non-producing capacities reduce the earnings because staff and
20Matthies (2005) speculated on a new unofficially announced corridor above 50 dollars. However, his
argumentation relies on the declaration of the OPEC president, who announced that “the basket price would
have to remain above 50 dollars for at least seven days before OPEC ministers would start discussing any increase
in production quotas.” I think this statement actually indicates the uncertainty among OPEC leaders on new
market structures.
21cf. Jones (1990), Adelman (1993), among others. Adelman uses the following phrase to describe the
existing threat to OPEC’s cartel stability. ”The cycle will continue: meetings–quotas–firm prices–cheating–price
declines–threats and promises–meetings ... with here and there some drastic political-military moves.”
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capital must still be paid whereas no revenues are generated. Hence, increasing free production
capacities might ultimately lead to the violation of OPEC-rules. However, the maintenance of
free capacity is necessary to increase oil supply in order to cut prices and to maintain OPEC’s
official price ranges. Both arguments together imply that there is an optimal free capacity rate
for OPEC as a whole as well as each OPEC member state.
Finally, in recent years OPEC’s power has been diminished by the increasing availability
of energy substitutes. As already mentioned, in many countries the per head consumption
decreased due to substitution in industrialised countries after the oil price shocks in the
seventies.22 There is some indication that a large movement is getting under way which might
reduce the oil dependence even further. In US states - especially in California - green technologies
are gaining ground due to recent policy decisions and growing global evidence for large costs
levied upon each of us through climate change. This recent development might be a threat to
oil-exporting countries since many of them strongly depend in particular on US demand.
To grasp OPEC’s influence on the oil price I specify the same set of OPEC variables as
Kaufmann et al. (2004). OPEC capu measures the utilization of production capacity of all
OPEC members. OPEC quota measures the ex-ante concerted production quotas in mbd and
OPEC cheat is the ex-post OPEC supply minus OPEC quota in mbd. I expect that a higher
utilisation of OPEC production capacity increases the price since possible shocks, either demand
shocks or temporary non-availability of non-OPEC production capacities, increase the risk of
supply shortages. In contrast, higher production quotas imply a higher supply and might reduce
prices. Finally, if OPEC members strongly violate the production quotas, cartel agreements are
of no relevance and prices might fall.23
2.4 Futures Market Factors
In the recent decades, the turnover of oil derivatives continuously increased and impact on the
spot market as well. Someone who needs oil in a future period has the option to purchase
today and store until the actual demand arises or to purchase a futures contract. Hence,
22Notice, only the per head consumption is nonincreasing whereas the total demand rose in last decades.
23Here, my expectations are in accordance with Kaufmann et al. (2004).
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Figure 4: Futures Prices and Traded Contracts at the NYMEX
(a) Spot and Futures Prices (b) Number of Traded Contracts
Spot Price Long Positions (in thousands)
FUT2 FUT4 Short Positions (in thousands)
Data Source: EIA, Monthly Energy Review 2006 and Bloomberg. The variable FUT1 is not shown in figure (a)
since this series is nearly indistinguishable from the spot price itself.
lagged futures prices might increase prediction accuracy since they may indicate expectations of
market participants. I will test whether the heavily traded lagged futures series of WTI contain
information on the spot price. Three different series are used and each futures variable is denoted
FUTq p where q is the term to maturity and p is the lag length. The maturities of 1-month,
2-months, and 4-months are available. I will test several lag structures. FUT2 and FUT4 as
well as the crude oil spot price are shown in Figure 4. Notice that the variable FUT1 is nearly
identical to the WTI spot series and therefore omitted. Typically, futures prices are quoted below
spot prices due to the convenience yield and market volatility (cf. Litzenberger and Rabinowitz
(1995), Pindyck (2001), among others). Such a situation is termed as backwardation and the
reverse, but seldom observed situation is called contango.24 Within the observation period it is
only during the Asian crisis, after 9/11, and at the end of the observation period that a contango
emerges where all three futures series were more expensive than spot prices.
In addition to the futures prices themselves, the number of long and short positions of the
WTI crude oil futures contracts at the NYMEX are used as an explanatory variable. The
variable FUT trade shown in Figure 4(b) is the difference between both long and short positions
and may capture expectations of market participants. For all futures market variables positive
24(We omit to distinguish strong backwardation, weak backwardation, and contango as done in many applied
articles, e.g. Considine and Larson (2001), explaining the spread between spot and futures prices.
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coefficients are expected since higher futures prices or a higher demand of long positions relative
to short positions should raise the price.
2.5 Summary of Hypotheses
Finally, Table 1 summarizes all variables, their meanings, and expected signs of corresponding
coefficients discussed in this section. In some cases, this variable set shown in Table 1 is extended.
I derive indicator variables or combine these variables in the econometric analysis in Sections 3
and 4. In addition to the variables described above, four indicator variables measuring calendar
effects or specific events have been added.
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Table 1: Summary of Hypotheses
Category Variable Description Sign
Demand Variables
Q Q glob global crude oil demand in mbd +
Q oecd crude oil demand in mbd of OECD +
Q indi crude oil demand in mbd of India +
Q chin crude oil demand in mbd of China +
OECD OECD days ratio of OECD’s oil stocks divided by Q oecd +/–
Supply Variables
PROD PROD rig Number of rigs +
PROD vlcc Charter prices measured in thousand USD per day of
very large crude-oil carriers (VLCC)
+
PROD fref Measures the available free global refining capacity –
OPEC OPEC capu OPEC supply relative to OPEC’s production capacity +
OPEC quota OPEC’s concerted production in mbd –
OPEC cheat OPEC production in mbd minus OPEC quota –
Futures Market Variables
FUT FUT trade Long minus short positions at NYMEX +
FUT1 q 1 month futures q month lagged +
FUT2 q 2 month futures q month lagged +
FUT4 q 4 month futures q month lagged +
Indicator Variables
I I spring Indicates spring months - March, April, May +/–
I summer Indicates summer month - June, July, August +/–
I event(+) Indicates positive events on the supply side such as US
SPR realeses, Iraqi oil fields were not destroyed during
military action in 2003, etc.
–
I event(–) Indicates negative events at the supply side such as
hurricane Katrina and Rita, etc.
+
Abbreviations: Q=demanded quantity, PROD=production, FUT=futures variables, and I=indicator variables.
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Table 2: Tests Statistics for Annual and Seasonal Unit Roots
Test ADF 00 HEGY 00 HEGY 00 ADF 06 HEGY 06 HEGY 06
Coeff γ pi1 pi2 γ pi1 pi2
WTI -0.416 1.085 0.076 -0.005 2.204 -1.173
OECD days -2.876+ -1.233 0.233 -4.353** -2.229 -0.314
OPEC quota -2.082 -0.137 -0.463 -1.721 1.071 -2.157*
OPEC cheat -1.691 1.170 -0.298 -2.252 0.553 -1.360
OPEC capu -1.700 -0.503 -1.100 -2.783+ 0.534 -1.130
Own Source: ADF test include four lags. The ADF column tests the full sample while ADF 00 tests
for unit roots in the subsample until September 2000. The same holds for HEGY and HEGY 00. For
HEGY tests a maximal lag length of 12 months was used. Critical values of t-statistics for pi1 and pi2
are reported in Franses and Hobijn (1997). 1%, 5%, 10% significance levels are labelled by **, *, +.
3 Cointegration Analysis
In this Section the analysis done by Kaufmann et al. (2004) is replicated.25 First, the degree
of integration of the variables is tested. To test for unit roots I performed the Augmented
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test as well as the HEGY unit root test.26 pi1 in Table 2 tests for unit
roots, whereas pi2 also tests for seasonal unit roots. The null hypothesis in the ADF and HEGY
is that each series is nonstationary. Since most test statistics do not reject the null, most series
are nonstationary. In addition, to compare the results with the one found by Kaufmann et
al. (2004) unit roots were also tested for a subsample lasting until September 2000.27 I used the
suffix 00 in this Section to indicate the restricted sample and 06 for the full sample.
Results shown in the columns OLS 00, DOLS 00, and FIML 00 in Table 3 are quite similar
to the results presented in Kaufmann et al. (2004). Except for OPEC cheat, the signs of the
coefficients are the same and I also find significant coefficients. Additionally, the adjustment
rate α is negative and significant only in the FIML 00 specification, whereas in Kaufmann et
al. (2004) all α are significant. However, the full-sample regressions shown in the 06 columns
report different results. In particular, the coefficients of OPEC variables change their sign.
Furthermore, the adjustment rate is positive in two regressions.28
25Therefore, in Section 3 econometric papers explaining estimation methods are not mentioned here but can be
found in Kaufmann et al. (2004).
26Hylleberg et al. (1990).
27The quarterly data set of Kaufmann et al. (2004) lasts until the third quartal 2000.
28All lag lengths are chosen using the Akaike information criterion.
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Furthermore, the results in both samples strongly depend on the chosen specification. For
example, I found no clear evidence for stationary OLS and DOLS residuals, which indicates that
no cointegration relation might exist. The rejection of these unit roots depends on the chosen
unit root test as well as on the number of lags included. Hence, these tests are not robust to
different specifications.29 Also, the results of the vector error correction model (VECM) are not
robust to other specifications. For the 00-sample, the null of no cointegration is clearly rejected30
by the trace statistic λJ = 78.88 and λSL = 63.61. However, the second but not the third null
hypothesis can also be rejected, indicating a cointegration rank of two.31 Moreover and again,
the cointegration rank estimated by the trace statistics depends on the number of chosen lags.
The estimation results reported in the FIML 06-column in Table 3 are performed under the
assumption of a single cointegration rank, though again both rank tests do not clearly confirm
this number of cointegration relations for the full sample.32 The results are different relative to
the findings of Kaufmann et al. (2004) and relative to the FIML 00 column. In particular, the
signs of the OPEC capu and OPEC quota coefficient are reversed.
The different results found for both samples are not surprising because, as shown in Figure 1,
the WTI time series is relatively stable until 2000. Subsequently, the oil price was strongly
boosted and has at least doubled. To test for structural differences before and after 2000 I
perform Chow tests after the cointegration regression of the full sample. Both the Chow sample
split and the Chow break point test indicate structural breaks as shown in Figure 5. The Chow
break point test indicates a high instability of the crude oil price model, whereas the Chow
sample split in particular suggests the end of 2001 as possible structural break point. Hence,
the most sensible timeframe is the period after September 2001. The 9/11 event definitely
changed the world and rattled financial markets. Moreover, the Chow break point test indicates
a greater degree of stability in 2002. For the development of an econometric oil price model
29For instance, Phillips-Perron tests usually reject the null for most lag length and a cointegration relation is
implied. Yet, other unit roots fail to reject the null.
30Cf. Johansen (1995), Saikkonen and Lu¨tkepohl (2000) abbreviated by J and SL.
31The corresponding p-values for the Johansen test with one lag are p(r=0)=0.0341, p(r=1)=0.0812,
p(r=2)=0.2365 and for the Saikkonen and Lu¨tkepohl test p(r=0)=0.0231, p(r=1)=0.0563, p(r=2)=0.2851. In
both tests the chosen lag length is one due to Hannan-Quinn and Schwarz criterion whereas the Akaike criterion
proposes six lags. Maximal lag length was six. I included a constant but no other deterministic terms.
32I found either two or three cointegration ranks independent of the chosen test (Johansen vs. Saikkonen and
Lu¨tkepohl and independent of the specification constant or ’constant and trend’).
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Table 3: Estimates for Price Equation
Dependent Variable: P (Crude Oil Price)
Test OLS 00 DOLS 00 FIML 00 OLS 06 DOLS 06 FIML 06
Cointegrating Relation
Constant 90.61** 122.48** -83.92** 40.88 141.25+ -309.63**
(3.66) (7.42) χ2(1) 17.96 (0.77) (1.90) χ2(1) 17.54
OECD days -0.96** -1.37** 1.03** -1.20** -2.16** 2.67**
(4.42) (6.57) χ2(1) 279.46 (2.87) (2.84) χ2(1) 16.08
OPEC capu 58.32* 80.71** -214.17** -92.61* -120.65* 185.48**
(2.16) (3.85) χ2(1) 41.52 (2.27) (2.61) χ2(1) 11.28
OPEC cheat 1.54+ 1.37* 13.19** 0.03 -2.51* 10.21**
(1.74) (2.59) χ2(1) 87.07 (0.02) (1.27) χ2(1) 26.96
OPEC quota -2.15+ -2.84* 6.21** 6.69** 7.12** -4.68**
(1.79) (2.63) χ2(1) 49.59 (4.27) (4.57) χ2(1) 9.04
R2 0.491 0.878 0.523 0.683
R
2 0.420 0.788 0.500 0.605
DW 0.996 1.245 0.385 0.497
Short Run Dynamics
Adjustment rate (α) -0.035 -0.288 -0.57** 0.062* 0.033 -0.03**
(0.58) (1.26) (11.33) (2.02) (0.84) (1.42)
Number of Lags(s) 0 6 6 3 3 3
Own Source: OLS and DOLS estimation routines use Newey-West standard errors. 1%, 5%, 10% significance
levels are labelled by **, *, +. Absolute t-values are in parentheses below the coefficients. R
2
is the adjusted R2
and DW is the Durbin-Watson statistic. Cointegration coefficients are normalized such that the coefficient of the
lagged price is one. The coefficients and statistics of the indicator variables (quartals and specific events) are not
reported. The number of lags(s) is chosen using the Akaike information criterion. The maximal lag length was
restricted to six. For DOLS two leads and two lags are included. VECM are estimated under the assumption of
a single cointegration relation. The coefficient of the lagged price variable is 1.00. For both VECMs an intercept
and a trend are included as a deterministic term whereas the error correction term includes only a constant.
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Figure 5: p-Values of Structural Break Tests under the Null of Parameter Constancy
Chow Break Point Test Chow Sample Split Test
Own Source: The ordinates show bootstrapped p-values. Points below the 0.1 threshold imply
structural breaks. Observations before and after the shown time span are excluded in the structural
break analysis due to the lack of degrees of freedom.
explaining the recent market situation I neglect the data before January 2002 and focus on the
49 observations33 until January 2006.34
The Chow tests indicates that the assumption of parameter constancy is not maintainable.
After the reduction of the sample, I continued the level analysis. However, my findings were
not convincing due to the lack of robustness. Several cointegration relations, Granger causality
tests, and other standard time series methods were tested but failed to supply an adequate
specification. Similar to the results reported in Table 2 and Table 3 all estimations strongly
depend on the chosen lag length, and small model specifications considerably changed the results.
Therefore, I turn to the analysis of a market model in the next section.
33Note, the complete sample of Kaufmann et al. (2004) had also around 50 observations.
34Under the assumption that September 2001 was an important date which changed the market structure
Kaufmann et al. (2004) cannot be used for today’s analysis. Also, the extension Dees et al. (2005) using quarterly
data until the end of 2002 is then not applicable to current market conditions.
18
4 Market Model
Here, a market model for the demand and supply of oil is specified. To circumvent spurious
regression results first differences of variables are used as covariates. All variables were found
to be integrated of order one. The analysis of differenced series can be seen as a drawback
relative to a level analysis. However, it is always possible to reconstruct the level series from
the differences. The main reason for choosing a model in first differences is its simplicity which
allows us to understand and extend the specifications. Last but not least, the explanatory power
of the model makes me very confident that a well-founded research model has been established.
The demand and supply functions are modelled as price and quantity equations. First,
I argue that the current demand for oil is independent of the current oil price. Hence, the
simultaneity issue must not be taken into account here. Subsequently, at the end of this
section this assumption is justified by applying appropriate techniques. More importantly, sound
economic reasoning supports the assumption. If production plans of companies budget oil as
an input factor, then the optimal moment of purchase might be considered but not the trade
per se. Similarly, many commuters have no choice and pay almost any fuel price to get to
work. In the long-run firms and households will reduce the demand for oil by buying more
efficient machineries and cars or by simply replacing petrol engines. Therefore, the oil demand
might depend on past demand variables to control for certain demand patterns. In addition and
as shown in Equation (1), the indicator variable I spring was found to be significant. In the
months March, April, and May the demand for oil was significantly smaller than in the rest of
the year. The indicator function I events(+) is also strongly significant. The quantity function is
estimated by OLS, where I used lags of one and twelve months. OLS is applicable here because
∆Q globt = 0.788− 0.320 ∆Q globt−1 + 0.417 ∆Q globt−12 − 2.408 I event(+)− 2.040 I spring (1)
(5.253) (3.145) (2.735) (2.782) (4.621)
N = 49, R2 = 0.604, R2 = 0.568, DW = 2.57 |t− values| in ()
lagged variables and indicator variables are predetermined and endogenous variables are not
present.35
35Notice, the indicator variables increase the fit but change the results only slightly. Without the indicator
variables, the coefficients are −0.254 (2.492) for ∆Q globt−1 and 0.755 (5.868) for ∆Q globt−12.
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The inclusion of the lagged demand variables is preferable from an economic point of view
but due to the presence of autocorrelation might produce poor econometric results. The
Breusch-Godfrey test clearly rejects the null of no-autocorrelation for any number of lagged
errors. In general, this situation can lead to inconsistent coefficients. Therefore, I estimate the
model without the lagged variables to test the impact on the indicator variables. The coefficients
∆Q glob = 0.942 − 2.686 I events(+) − 2.730 I spring
(5.873) (14.372) (10.495)
N = 49, R2 = 0.425, R2 = 0.400, DW = 2.76 |t− values| in ()
of the second model are similar to the first specification since the signs of the indicator variables
are unaffected and magnitudes of coefficients and p-values change only slightly. Therefore, at
least the regression coefficients of the indicator variables seem quite reliable. Due to the presence
of negative autocorrelation - as opposed to positive autocorrelated residuals - I can hope that
the error is negligible.
In addition to the reported specifications, I tested several different lag structures for ∆Q glob,
however, the best fit was found for lags of one and twelve months. The significant and negative
coefficient of ∆Q globt−1 and positive coefficient of ∆Q globt−12 show that changes in demand
are negatively influenced by demand changes in the preceding month and positively influenced
by demand changes a year previously. A reasonable interpretation of this finding is that potential
demanders have some choice whether they fill their oil stocks in this or the preceding month,
which might explain the negative coefficient of ∆Q globt−1. The one-year effect might indicate
that firms as well as some household current plans often rest upon previous year’s plans. If
most demanders in an economy act in accordance with this assumption and plans are typically
specified at a definite month of a year then a positive coefficient of ∆Q globt−12 is likely to
emerge.
Price Equation
After the specification of the quantity equation I turn to the development of a price model.
Before I present the estimation results, there is a description of main findings. One of the main
driving forces is the increased number of speculators who are not interested in the commodity
itself, but in buying low and selling high. As shown in Figure 4(b), futures traders heavily
increased their long positions, thereby boosting the futures price, and contemporaneously the
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spot price rises. However, I believe that speculators are attracted by economic factors and not
by unfounded gambling. In particular, there are several possible paucities in the production
process of oil. This risk is latent due to political instability in the Arab and Persian World as
well as the impending lack of free capacities. The increasing oil demand of large economies such
as China and India are per se of minor importance for the observed upward trend in recent
years. However, the rather small increase in the global oil demand due to the economic growth
in these emerging countries may have utilized large parts of the otherwise free refining capacities,
as shown in Figure 3(b). Hence, although the produced crude oil satisfied the crude oil demand,
there was the risk of a supply scarcity of refined products. At the end of the observation period
global oil demand exceeded the available refining capacities. Hence, this paucity of refined
products increased their market value and, due to the high cointegration of refined products
and crude oil (cf. Gjolberg and Johnsen (1999), Asche et al. (2003), Hammoudeh and Li (2004),
among others) the WTI price series also rose.36
Figure 6 underpins this argumentation where the utilitsation of refining capacity is restricted
to 100%.37 These utilisation diagrams indicate how often refining facilities were working to
capacity. In particular, in recent months the refining process seems to have been a bottleneck.
It is obvious that the crude oil price increased when the refining capacity utilisation was around
100%. Subfigure (b) shows also that the OPEC production capacity was utilised by around 95%
and that prices heavily increased before the capacity limit have been reached. This might indicate
that the influence of this OPEC variable has diminished. Furthermore, it seems reasonable that
this scarcity was easily predictable due to the high investment costs necessary for installing new
refineries. Hence, institutional investors had incentives to invest in the oil market and bought
long futures contracts.
The following regression analyses may be even more convincing than the verbal arguments
and the data description. All results use the WTI price series as dependent variable. The first
regressions results of specification (A1) is shown in Table 4. The first differences of global oil
demand Q glob and the first difference of the variable FUT trade is included. Furthermore, three
36It may be argued that the crude oil price rise due to a higher world crude oil demand. However, the world
crude oil demand is a result of the increased demand for refined products.
37At the start of 2006 the lack of refining capacity was quickly remedied and production was extended to 85.127
mbd. Hence, given the linear interpolation of the yearly refining capacity some of the values in 2005 and 2006
might be error-prone. Therefore, I restrict the capacity utilisation to 100%.
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Table 4: Modelling the Price Equation
Dependent Variable: ∆WTI (Ordinary Least Squares)
Variable (A1) (A2) (A3) (B) (C1) (C2)
const -0.908+ -0.373 -0.184 -1.001* -0.944+ -0.931
(1.83) (0.98) (0.52) (2.10) (1.74) (2.01)
∆Q glob -0.466* -0.420+ -0.487* -0.434+ -0.491* -0.492*
(2.19) (1.95) (2.18) (1.91) (2.27) (2.33)
∆FUT trade 0.793** 0.687** 0.661** 0.787** 0.822** 0.820**
(6.03) (4.68) (4.68) (5.99) (5.33) (5.75)
PROD I97ref 2.132** 1.879** 2.13** 2.114**
(3.72) (3.32) (3.40) (4.00)
PROD I98ref 1.686**
(3.22)
PROD I98ref 1.714*
(2.62)
I event(+) -2.249** -1.868 -2.335+ -1.948* -2.458** -2.444**
(2.84) (1.50) (1.94) (2.14) (2.99) (3.07)
I event(–) 0.956+
(1.90)
I summer 1.906** 1.609* 1.912* 1.858** 2.000** 1.965**
(2.95) (2.34) (2.25) (3.17) (2.86) (3.23)
∆OPEC capu 0.248 0.201*
(1.04) (2.146)
∆OPEC cheat -0.164
(0.20)
∆OPEC quota -0.18
(0.19)
N 49 49 49 49 49 49
R2 0.601 0.571 0.562 0.619 0.615 0.615
R
2 0.555 0.522 0.511 0.564 0.538 0.560
DW 2.182 2.145 1.905 2.301 2.270 2.270
Own Source: Q glob is the traded quantity, FUT trade is the difference between long and
short contracts on the futures market in 10.000 contracts, PROD I97ref ( I98ref, I99ref) is
an indicator variable which is one if the utilized refining capacity is larger than 97% (98%,
99%), I events(+) is an indicator variable for positive and I events(–) an indicator variable for
negative events. OPEC capu is the utilized OPEC capacity in percent, OPEC cheat is OPEC’s
production above arranged levels, OPEC quota the arranged production level among OPEC
members. N is the number of observations, R
2
is the adjusted R2 and DW is an abbreviation
for the Durbin-Watson Statistic, absolute t-values in (). 1%, 5%, 10% significance levels are
labelled by **, *, +.
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Table 5: Modelling the Price Equation (cont.)
Dependent Variable: ∆WTI (Ordinary Least Squares)
Variable (D1) (D2) (E1) (E2)
const -0.776+ -0.390 -0.492 0.318
(1.77) (0.83) (1.36) (0.57)
∆Q glob -0.431* -0.409* -0.412* -0.379*
(2.24) (2.08) (2.34) (2.36)
∆FUT trade 0.743** 0.742** 0.774** 0.654**
(4.84) (5.12) (4.58) (3.86)
PROD I97ref 2.05** 2.389** 1.754** 1.545**
(4.32) (3.70) (4.33) (3.66)
I event(+) -2.244** -2.018* -1.881*
(3.23) (2.27) (2.25)
I summer 1.977** 1.787** 1.781** 1.779**
(3.48) (3.42) (3.99) (3.52)
∆OPEC capu 0.196* 0.172* 0.327** 0.279*
(2.28) (2.09) (2.79) (2.40)
∆PROD rig -0.043* -0.043* -0.049* -0.063**
(2.11) (2.15) (2.54) (3.08)
∆PROD vlcc -0.010
(0.75)
∆SPREAD1 2 -6.355** -7.324**
(3.01) (3.19)
FUT1 Icont 6 -1.216+
(1.78)
N 49 49 49 49
R2 0.658 0.664 0.707 0.724
R
2 0.599 0.597 0.648 0.668
DW 2.300 2.343 2.364 2.297
Own Source: PROD rig is the number of rigs, PROD vlcc charter prices of very large
crude oil carriers, SPREAD1 2 is the two-month lagged difference between spot price
and one month futures, and FUT1 Icont 6 is a six month lagged indicator variable
which indicates a contango situation at the futures market. 1%, 5%, 10% significance
levels are labelled by **, *, +.
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Figure 6: Price-Diagrams of Capacity Utilisation Variables
(a) Refining Capacity Utilisation (b) OPEC Capacity Utilisation
◦ 2002  2003  2004 4 2005+
Own source: (a) Refining capacity utilization is the global demand relative to refining capacity in mbd. (b)
OPEC capacity utilization is calculated as OPEC production relative to OPEC’s capacity in mbd.
indicator variables PROD I97ref, I event(+), and I summer are used as covariates. The variable
PROD I97ref is an indicator variables which is one if the utilized refining capacity is above 97%.
The indicator variable I event(+) captures specific occurrences such as the information that Iraqi
oil fields had not been destroyed as had been feared during military actions in March 2003 or the
SPR release authorized by President Bush. All covariates are significant in specification (A1).
The negative sign of Q glob indicates that rising crude oil markets were not directly driven by
the demand side. FUT trade shows that if the difference of long minus short positions increase
in the futures market then the oil price is positively affected. This sales variable is preferable
to futures price variables since spot and futures price series are closely coupled due to directly
observable convenience yield and market volatility (cf. Considine and Larson (2001), Bahram et
al. (2006), among others). The positive coefficient of PROD I97ref indicates rising prices if the
utilisation of refining capacity was above 97%. Positive events reduce the price and rising prices
were especially observed in the summer months.38
In specification (A2) and (A3) I replace PROD I97ref by PROD I98ref or PROD I99ref.
Again, the coefficient of the refining capacity variable is positive and strongly significant.
The magnitude of these coefficients decreases relative to specification (A1). A reasonable
interpretation might be that it is very easy to predict the impending lack of refining capacity
38Notice, the estimation without the indicator variables change the results only slightly. The results are -0.291
(1.468) for ∆Q glob, 0.830 (6.248) for ∆FUT trade, and 1.731 (2.848) for PROD I97ref. Thus, the refining
capacity and the futures variable are still significant.
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and that the actual further reduction of free refining capacity from three percent to even less
was expected and caused no larger price change.
To test the effect of hurricanes and local supply disruptions the variable I event(–) was also
included in specification (B). The positive coefficient shows that these negative events had an
effect but due to a low significance level and a small magnitude I omit this variable in other
specifications.
In specification (C1) and (C2), I continue the analysis of OPEC variables of Section 3. All
coefficients of the OPEC variables show the expected signs. Yet, if all OPEC variables are
included no significant effect is detectable in (C1). However, due to relatively high correlations
among these variables I can find a positive effect of the variable OPEC capu in (C2), which
indicates that an increasing capacity utilisation significantly increases the spot crude oil price.
However, the overall effect of this variable is small, as shown below, and Figure 6(b) signalizes
that OPEC’s production was not working to capacity. It is possible that the significant variable
hints at the high sensibility of market participants who have a close eye on all aspects of
production capacities. Therefore, I keep this variable in further investigations reported in
Table 5.
Additional production variables such as PROD rig and PROD vlcc are tested in
specifications (D1) and (D2). No influence was found for the variable PROD vlcc whereas
PROD rig was significant. The negative coefficient implies a lower WTI spot price if more
drilling rigs have been active. The interpretation of this finding might be similar to other
findings at the production side if a larger number of rigs is active the risk of shortages due to
wars or natural disasters might be smaller.
In the last two specifications39, the influence of futures prices is more closely investigated.
I found lagged variables which significantly impinge on the crude oil price. In columns (E1)
and (E2) I document the most important findings. First, the highly significant variable
39I tested several other specifications and variables. For instance, macroeconomic variables such as GDP and FX
variables of large and important nations and currencies were included. I also tested the impact of OECD stock,
OECD days, as well as several variables which capture information on US petroleum stocks (see Footnote 13).
However, the quality of the models improved in neither case. For the sake of brevity, the results are not reported
here.
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Figure 7: Spread in USD of WTI Spot minus Futures Prices
SPREAD1 SPREAD2 SPREAD4
Own Source: SPREADp is the difference of the WTI spot price and the variable FUTp.
∆SPREAD1 2 is the two-month lagged spread of the spot price minus the one-month futures
price. Given the negative coefficient, if two months ago the futures price was above the spot
price the variable was negative and the current spot price rises. The large magnitude of the
coefficient is a result of the small spreads. If spreads between the spot price and other futures
series were used as covariates, the magnitude of the coefficients was still significant but much
smaller since the spreads were larger as shown in Figure 7. Finally, I also found a strong negative
impact of the indicator variable FUT1 Icont 6 which indicates contangos, i.e. situations where
the futures price is above the spot price. This six-month lagged indicator variable significantly
reduces the crude oil price. Both futures variables indicate the interplay of the convenience
yield and market volatility on the spot price. Obviously and given the theoretical considerations
in the literature, a lagged large convenience yield and a high market volatility both seem to
have predicting power for future spot prices. Notice that the refining capacity variables are less
important if the contango variable is included and the coefficient of the constant also becomes
positive. I can therefore conclude that it is not only the number of long- vs. short futures
contracts which are of importance in determining the crude oil price development, but also the
futures price variables.
To get a better understanding of the models I depicted the estimated price movements of
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model (A1) and (E2) in Figure 8. Both estimated series closely replicate the original series fairly
well. Furthermore, so far I have identified the statistical significance of several variables, however,
the magnitude or economic significance of each variable on the crude oil price was not evaluated.
To gain intuition on the functioning of the model, a specific month and the decomposition implied
by the estimated price model is discussed. In January 2006, the crude oil price jumped from
59.41 to 65.48 USD. Model (A1) in Table 4 calculates a value of 62.62 in December and 65.79
in January and model (E2) compute 61.23 and 65.77. Therefore, the observed price difference
is 6.07 and the estimated price difference is 3.17 USD in model (A1) and 4.54 in model (E2).
Given these specifications, the price differences are decomposed as shown in Table 6. This
decomposition was conducted for the whole sample and the results can be interpreted as follows.
If all effects for model (A1) are decomposed I find that ∆FUT trade and the refining capacity
variable mainly determine the WTI price change. Correspondingly, if large spot price jumps
occurred, they were mainly caused by large movements in the futures variable. In particular,
large price drops are strongly driven by ∆FUT trade. The same analysis for model (E1) is more
complicated due to the higher number of variables. However, if I summarize all effects of futures
variables, i.e. ∆FUT trade, ∆SPREAD1 2 and FUT1 Icont 6, and of all production variables,
i.e. PROD I97ref, ∆OPEC capu, and ∆PROD rig, then the same statements already mentioned
for model (A1) apply again. Accordingly, all three futures variables contribute similarly to the
development of the WTI spot series whereas the effect of production variables are mainly driven
by the refining capacity variable.40
40The strong influence of PROD rig in Table 6 was rather atypical.
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Figure 8: Original WTI Spot Price and Estimated Series
WTI series model (A1) model (E2)
Own Source: Corresponding regression results can be found in Table 4 and Table 5.
Table 6: Decomposition of Effects for January 2006
Observations Coefficients Product
Variable Jan 2006 (A1) (E2) (A1) (E2)
const 1 -0.908 0.318 -0.908 0.318
∆Q glob -1.668 -0.466 -0.379 0.777 0.632
∆FUT trade 1.467 0.793 0.654 1.163 0.959
PROD I97ref 1 2.132 1.545 2.132 1.545
I event(+) 0 -2.249 0
I summer 0 1.906 1.779 0 0
∆OPEC capu -2.004 0.279 -0.559
∆PROD rig -43 -0.063 2.709
∆SPREAD1 2 -0.020 -7.324 0.146
FUT1 Icont 6 1 -1.216 -1.216
Sum(=Price Diff.) 3.165 4.534
Own Source: The observations are the values observed for the corresponding
variables in January 2006. The coefficients are the results reported in Table 4
and Table 5. Subsequently, the product of both observation values and coefficients
is calculated to identify the most important effects.
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Model Checking
I stressed that OLS is applicable in the price model. However, this statement is questionable
if endogenous variables are used as covariates. There are two possible sources of simultaneity
in model (A1). First, current quantity might be affected by current price movements. Second,
FUT trade might not only impinge on the oil price but might also be determined by the price
series itself. All other variables in this system are exogenous since they are indicator variables
capturing specific events or seasonal effects. To explain the variable ∆FUT trade I use the
following equation
∆FUT trade = 0.317 + 0.437 ∆WTI − 0.213 ∆FUT1 1− 0.202 ∆FUT1 2− 0.279 ∆FUT1 3 (2)
(1.275) (3.687) (2.990) (2.747) (4.140)
N = 49, R2 = 0.596, R2 = 0.559, DW = 2.11 |t− values| in ()
I estimate the reduced forms of equation (1) and (2) and use the residuals of both equations to
perform a Hausman endogeneity test for model (A1) and (E2). Subsequently, an F-test clearly
rejects the null of no endogeneity.41 To correct for simultaneity in overidentified regression
models I apply two stage least squares (2SLS) developed by Theil (1953) and Bassmann (1957).
In Table 7 OLS and 2SLS regression results are compared. All exogenous variables of all
equations are used as instruments in the 2SLS procedures. In both specifications the 2SLS
coefficients are very similar to the OLS coefficients. However, in the 2SLS estimation process
several variables become insignificant. The coefficients of the variables Q glob, FUT trade and
PROD I97ref are significant independent of the method applied. Therefore, the findings support
the story set out above. Furthermore, the Breusch-Godfrey tests for autocorrelation usually
failed to reject the null. Diagnostic checks such as Jarque-Bera tests on the residuals as well as
Ramsey’s (1969) specification error test always confirmed the validity of the chosen specifications.
Finally, also multicollinearity is not an issue here. Hence, I am quite confident that the model
is well-specified and captures the development of the crude oil price.
41Correspondingly, I can - as mentioned at the start of Section 4 - confirm that the demand variable seems to
be exogenous whereas the endogeneity problem arises due to the futures variable.
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Table 7: Inspection of Simultaneity
Dependent Variable: ∆WTI
(A1) (A1) (E2)
Variable OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
const -0.908+ -0.915+ 0.318 0.105
(1.83) (1.73) (0.57) (0.14)
∆Q glob -0.466* -0.475* -0.379* -0.493*
(2.19) (2.35) (2.36) (2.37)
∆FUT trade 0.793** 0.794** 0.654** 0.704**
(6.03) (4.37) (3.86) (2.74)
PROD I97ref 2.132** 2.143** 1.545** 1.684**
(3.72) (3.64) (3.66) (3.60)
I event(+) -2.249** -2.273**
(2.84) (3.01)
I summer 1.906** 1.916** 1.779** 1.903**
(2.95) (2.91) (3.52) (3.73)
∆OPEC capu 0.279* 0.342
(2.40) (0.68)
∆PROD rig -0.063** -0.054+
(3.08) (1.76)
∆SPREAD1 2 -7.324** -7.585*
(3.19) (2.43)
FUT1 Icont 6 -1.216+ -1.069
(1.78) (1.09)
N 49 49 49 49
R2 0.601 0.601 0.724 0.717
R
2 0.555 0.555 0.668 0.661
DW 2.182 2.188 2.297 2.373
Own Source: Q glob is the traded quantity, FUT trade is the difference between
long and short contracts on the futures market in 10.000 contracts, PROD I97ref is
an indicator variable for the refining capacity, I events(+) an indicator variable for
positive events, and I summer an indicator variable for summer months. OPEC capu
is the capacity utilisation of OPEC countries, PROD rig counts the number of oil
rigs, SPREAD1 2 is the two-month lagged spread between the WTI series and the
one-month futures, and FUT1 Icont 6 is an indicator variable for contangos. N is the
number of observations, R
2
is the adjusted R2 and DW is an abbreviation for the
Durbin-Watson Statistic, absolute t-values in (). 1%, 5%, 10% significance levels are
labelled by **, *, +.
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5 Conclusion
Unlike Kaufman et al. (2004), I cannot confirm a strong market power of OPEC in recent years.
I only find a modest influence of OPEC’s capacity utilisation on the WTI series. This finding
possibly hints at the high interest in all production variables rather than at OPEC’s market
power. OPEC was more a passive observer than a price setter. In contrast, the estimation
results imply that the upward trend at the spot market can be explained by an increasing crude
oil demand of emerging markets. The additional demand meets the constrained refining capacity
such that nearly no free refining capacities were available. Hence, an additional demand or a
loss of refining capacity had caused an excess demand. Due to this potential threat investors
steadily increased their demand for long WTI futures contracts and contemporaneously spot
prices were pushed up.
Given these results, the question arises as to what caused this paucity of refining capacity.
Moreover, it might be enlightening to understand incentives of refinery operators to extend
or not extend the refining capacity. One explanation is that due to the 9/11 attacks the
petroleum industry feared a declining world economy and postponed large investment projects.
Then the economy recovered and the crude oil demand increased due to the rising demand of
emerging countries. After this development continued for several months, investments in new
refineries were made but these were not operable before the end of 2005. In accordance with this
hypothesis, Asano (2002) showed for the US refining industry that a lag of four to seven years
exists between economic conditions and the completion of new refinery capacities. However,
incentives of refinery operators might also have contributed to this development. Refinery
operators might prefer high oil prices and may take into account that possible production
scarcities guarantee this aim. Since many refinery operators are also large crude oil producers
this line of argument is appealing. Eicher (2006) argues that both fundamental factors, such as
large investment costs and incentives, might have hindered a faster increase in global refining
capacity.
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6 Data Appendix
The Energy Information Administration provided WTI series, futures series,
demand, and stock data. PROD rig is data of Baker-Hughes from the website
http://www.bakerhughes.com/investor/rig/index.htm and PROD vlcc is available at
http://www.pfbassoe.no/welcome.htm. Most data was observed each month. Otherwise,
data was linearly interpolated. Finally, the refining capacity series was provided by EIA and
the Oil&Gas Journal (OGJ), which published figures on the refining capacity in 2005. EIA
figures which are based on the OGJ data inform on the annual average, whereas OGJ publishes
end-of-year figures. For the end of the observation sample, the values of both sources are
summarized in Table 8.
Table 8: Comparison of Refining Capacity Data
Data Source Average 2004 Begin 2005 Average 2005 Begin 2006
EIA 82.260 82.800
OGJ 82.409 85.127
Own Source: All figures are measured in mbd. OGJ values represent the situation
on 1st January, whereas the REF variables are averages of mid-month values from
December and January (or averages of June and July figures).
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